In this blog post, we will examine why Wittgenstein believed that the meaning of language varies depending on context and rules, as well as the concept of “language games” presented in his later philosophy.
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be divided into early and late periods. His early work is represented by the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, while his late work is represented by the *Philosophical Investigations*. He believed that philosophical problems stem from the ambiguous use of language and sought to resolve them by analyzing and critiquing language to achieve clarity. For this reason, his philosophical thought is centered on language.
In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein maintained the position that language is a mirror that accurately reflects the world. In this work, he explained the role of language through the picture theory, which holds that language reflects the state of the world and that the structure of language must correspond to the structure of the world. This position reflects his early philosophical belief that language possesses objective and fixed meanings.
However, in his later period, he criticized his early philosophy and attempted a new approach. In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein presents arguments that differ from his earlier work, based on a critical stance toward the picture theory he had advocated in the *Tractatus*. In the picture theory, he viewed the words of language as naming objects, and sentences as combinations of these names. In other words, he held that the meaning of a word is determined by the object it designates. However, in his later philosophy, unlike the picture theory, Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of a word lies in its use. He put forward a new claim that the meaning of a word is not fixed but is understood according to the context and rules in which the word is used.
This claim implies that words in language can perform various functions; according to him, such diversity is not fixed but fluid. Therefore, the meaning of language can vary depending on the situation and context, which means that language cannot be explained by a fixed logical structure. This shift represents a significant turning point in how Wittgenstein understood the relationship between language and the world.
Regarding the meaning of words, Wittgenstein introduces the concept of family resemblance. Family resemblance is a concept that applies the likeness among family members to language, signifying a complex web of overlapping and intersecting similarities. For example, the word “play” can refer to various activities such as card games, hide-and-seek, word games, soccer, and baseball. There is no single quality common to all of these; rather, there are only qualities that partially overlap and intersect with one another. If a property common to all the objects the word “play” can refer to were to be found, it would become a fixed meaning—the essence of play. However, no such essence exists; there are only relationships between the parts that are connected in countless different ways. Therefore, the word “play” is not used with a single essential meaning but is used with various meanings depending on context and rules.
Wittgenstein likened language to a game and devised the concept of “language games,” which refers to the totality composed of language and the actions with which it is intertwined. He devised this concept to emphasize that speaking a language is part of an activity and is based on a form of life. Language is not merely a system of signs or symbols; it acquires meaning through actual use within a social context. This emphasizes that language derives its meaning from interactions between people rather than possessing a fixed meaning in and of itself.
According to him, language games can disappear or emerge anew; they vary in type and function. While different language games do not share a common essence, they form a family resemblance and consist of language and the actions associated with it. For example, when someone on a construction site says “Hammer!”, the word is not used merely to refer to the hammer lying there, but with the purpose of asking for the hammer to be handed over. He argues that if one merely knows that the hammer in this situation refers to the object “hammer,” one cannot participate in the language game taking place within the context of that construction site. Language games are only possible when one knows the context and rules and acts accordingly.
Wittgenstein argues that the rules of language are based on the “form of life”—the way of life or manner in which the people using that language live. Therefore, language is public; he maintains that if one does not engage in any activity that follows the rules within a language game, it cannot be called language. He defines language without such regularity as “private language.”
According to him, since private language lacks regularity, it cannot be understood by others, and I myself cannot understand it precisely, making language games impossible. Wittgenstein views the convergence of the forms of life among language users as the prerequisite for language rules to function. This implies that for language to serve as a tool of communication, it requires not only a convergence of definitions but also a convergence of judgments. Agreement on definitions refers to agreement on the definitions of words, while agreement in judgment refers to agreement on how words are applied—ultimately, agreement on how one reacts to and perceives a given thing. For example, for “red” to serve as a tool of communication, one must know the definition of the word, that definition must be shared by all, and the reactions evoked by using “red” must also be consistent.
If people describe the color of an object as “red” yet their reactions do not align, the word “red” cannot be used as a tool for communication. The harmony of life-forms implies harmony in both definitions and judgments. In other words, the harmony of language use indicates that people share the same life-form.
The fact that the agreement of life-worlds is a prerequisite for the operability of linguistic rules implies that private language cannot exist. Private language is the language of a solipsistic world that takes my consciousness as its starting point. The domain in which linguistic rules operate is not the solipsistic world of my consciousness, but the community that includes you, me, and others—that is, our shared life-world. From Wittgenstein’s perspective, this suggests the fictitious nature of philosophical frameworks that take my consciousness as their starting point—frameworks that imply the possibility of a private language. In this regard, his later philosophy emphasizes that community and interaction are the crucial foundations of philosophical thought, opening up new ways to understand philosophical problems. This underscores that philosophy must move beyond the analysis of abstract concepts and instead explore meaning within the context of actual life and language use.
