In this blog post, we will take an in-depth look at the possibilities and limitations of music’s ability to represent specific objects or scenes—despite its inherently abstract nature—focusing on how it differs from pictorial representation.
Representational painting refers to art that depicts the appearance of objects in a manner similar to the actual subjects, allowing the viewer to identify what is depicted simply by looking at the painting. What, then, about music? If music must satisfy the same conditions required for painting to be considered representational, the question arises: must we conclude that all music, which inherently possesses an abstract structure, is incapable of representing objects? A frequently discussed core condition of pictorial representation is that there must be a certain resemblance between the experience of perceiving the painting and the experience of actually perceiving the object depicted within it. The argument that music struggles to meet this condition focuses on the fact that the purely musical elements of a musical work alone rarely evoke an immediate recognition of the represented object. For example, the argument goes, while a painting depicting an apple allows the viewer to recognize the subject as an apple based solely on the image—regardless of the title—music cannot be representational because such immediate recognition is difficult to achieve through music alone. The fact that it is difficult for a listener to perceive Debussy’s *La Mer*—one of his symphonic triplets—as a representation of the sea without any reference to the title is cited as evidence for this argument.
However, this argument is difficult to generalize. For example, a painting that depicts a section of a sandy beach in a hyperrealistic style belongs to the category of representational painting, but if the title is unknown, the subject of the representation may not be immediately apparent. Similarly, in Mondrian’s *Broadway Boogie-Woogie*, viewers who know the title can interpret the lines and color fields dividing the canvas as a plan view of New York’s street layout, whereas those unaware of the title are likely to perceive it as an abstract painting. Nevertheless, some scholars point out that while such cases are atypical in pictorial representation, similar situations are actually typical in music. In fact, it is true that cases in music where a piece is clearly perceived as representational without reference to a title or program are rare; the bird sounds in Beethoven’s “Pastoral Symphony” are merely a commonly cited example. However, it is necessary to reconsider whether this constitutes a reason to deny the representational potential of music. Considering the role that titles play in a work, the argument that the representational nature of music must be judged solely on the basis of its musical form is not necessarily valid.
Today, many musicologists regard not only lyrics but also the title of a work and even the programmatic setting that serves as its motif as constituent elements of the work. From this perspective, the claim that representation is established only if the content of a work can be recognized without the aid of the title can be considered an excessively strict criterion. This is because, if the title is part of the work, the representational nature of an artistic work must be judged based on the entire work, including the title. For example, in Schubert’s art song “Gretchen at the Spinning Wheel,” the simple accompaniment motif that repeats periodically sounds, when appreciated alongside the title, as a vivid depiction of the repetitive motion of the spinning wheel. In this way, the title in music serves as a functional element that supports the conditions of representation and is an integral part of understanding the work.
Scholars who view music as failing to meet the conditions of representation raise another issue regarding the understanding of a work. One characteristic of representational painting is that recognition of the represented object is an essential element for understanding the work. However, these scholars argue that musical works labeled as “representational” do not possess this characteristic. In other words, they contend that listeners face no significant difficulty in understanding the music even if they do not know what the work intends to represent. For example, even if a listener is unaware that “The Sea” was intended as a representation of the sea, they can still grasp the combinations of notes and the structure that make up the piece, and this grasp constitutes musical understanding.
However, a counterargument to this can certainly be raised. This is because if one relies solely on purely musical aspects without considering programmatic titles or the themes of the work, complete understanding may become impossible in certain works. A listener unfamiliar with the programmatic background would find it difficult to understand why the French national anthem suddenly appears in Tchaikovsky’s “1812 Overture,” or why the “March to the Scaffold” appears in the final section of Berlioz’s “Symphonie fantastique.” In fact, there is no purely musical basis to explain the appearance of these elements; they can only be elucidated through the programmatic narrative structure that the music seeks to depict. These examples demonstrate that representation and meaning formation in music cannot be fully achieved through structural analysis of musical figures alone, and clearly suggest that titles and programmatic contexts can be essential to understanding a work.
