In this blog post, we examine how Fayerevent’s anarchist epistemology influences the freedom and diversity of modern scientific inquiry.
According to Feuerabend’s anarchistic epistemology, scientists must be completely free to conduct their research. This is because existing methodologies provide overly simplistic rules compared to human talent and its potential for expression, which can stifle the unique ways in which humans think. In other words, he believed that the more sophisticated the rules become, the greater the risk that diverse human thought and the complex conditions of reality will be excluded. This idea is very explicitly revealed in his statement, “Anything goes.” Therefore, Feyerabend argues that since no two theories can be logically ranked in terms of superiority, science itself cannot be said to be superior to other forms of knowledge, such as astrology or magic.
Alan Chalmers, author of *What Is This Thing Called Science?*, criticizes Feyerabend’s argument. He argues that no one, including scientists, is granted the opportunity to explore “completely freely,” and that such freedom does not actually exist. Since scientists conduct their research under practical constraints—such as experimental conditions, the capabilities of their assistants, and their salaries—they cannot be free from all constraints. Furthermore, he criticizes astrology and magic, arguing that because they do not address the major problems of modern society, they cannot be freely chosen on an equal footing with science. I, however, wish to critique Alan Chalmers’ argument and lend support to Feyerabend’s anarchistic epistemology.
I agree with Chalmers’ critique that “there can be no inquiry under absolute freedom.” Realistic constraints are inevitable. However, this fact should not weaken a scientist’s will to pursue inquiry “completely freely,” nor should it serve as an obstacle that limits the direction of inquiry to conform solely to existing knowledge systems. The limitations imposed by experimental conditions and financial resources are merely a part of free scientific inquiry.
The Copenhagen interpretation, which first introduced the concept of uncertainty into physics and posits that the act of observation itself probabilistically determines scientific facts, was criticized at the time by many established scientists, including Schrödinger. Nevertheless, this theory became a crucial foundation of modern quantum mechanics. This was the result of free thinking that broke away from the conventional framework of classical physics, where theories were established based on the observation of phenomena. Another example is string theory. This theory posits that the matter constituting the universe exists not as conventional zero-dimensional particles, but as one-dimensional strings. Although the theory cannot be considered verified since even its precise mechanism of operation has not been proven, it has succeeded in offering new interpretations of phenomena that existing knowledge cannot explain, such as predicting the existence of gravitons. Even today, string theory is being actively researched despite its uncertain prospects. These studies are not based on induction through repeated observation, nor do they contain physically observable facts, so they cannot be falsified. However, by guaranteeing methodological freedom in scientific inquiry and respecting diversity, the body of scientific knowledge can become more robust through greater challenges and innovation. Although we cannot logically refute Chalmers’ claim that “completely free” scientific inquiry is impossible, the freedom of scientific inquiry infringed upon by practical constraints is only partial, and since much of it can be overcome through diverse methodologies, a pessimistic attitude is open to criticism.
Chalmers’ argument regarding the lack of urgency—namely, that astrology or magic cannot be chosen on an equal footing with science because they do not address the major problems of modern society—is also open to criticism. It is unclear whether a knowledge system occupies an inferior position relative to science because it does not address modern society’s major problems, or whether it has been marginalized by science—the established mainstream knowledge system—and thus unable to accumulate knowledge regarding these problems. Regardless of the completeness of a knowledge system, if it is shunned by society and the public, it is unlikely to evolve in a direction that addresses the major problems of modern society that capture public attention. This is because knowledge systems develop through discussion, and discussion arises from necessity.
What about religion, which possesses a sense of urgency? Each religion has different claims, worships different gods, and relies on different scriptures to explain the workings of the world. Nevertheless, many religious people living on the same planet believe in their respective gods, feel a deep sense of necessity, and obtain truth and determine their conduct based on those teachings. Does this mean that religion can stand on equal footing with science because it possesses this sense of urgency? What about the astrology or magic preached by the followers of those religions?
According to Chalmers’ critique, every legitimate knowledge system must possess urgency, and therefore modern people must feel a deep sense of necessity for that system. However, such an argument risks the fallacy of placing numerous non-scientific systems—for which modern people feel a sense of necessity—on the same level as science. Can the fact that modern people feel a deep sense of necessity serve as evidence that a system is suitable to become the methodology constituting science? The answer is no. Therefore, Chalmers’s criticism based on the lack of urgency in other knowledge systems is invalid.
Thus far, I have countered Chalmers’s two criticisms of Feyerabend’s anarchic epistemology—namely, the unrealistic nature of a methodology that seeks freedom from all constraints and the lack of urgency in non-scientific knowledge systems—and have lent weight to Feyerabend’s epistemology. While I agree that freedom from all constraints cannot exist, I emphasized that there remains a need to pursue a free methodology and a system of knowledge formation that respects the individual scientist’s framework of thought. Furthermore, I argued that the lack of urgency—the failure to address major issues in modern society—is not sufficient to logically determine the superiority of one methodology over another.
Of course, the author is not suggesting that astrology, magic, or religion be placed on the same level as science. A pessimistic attitude that questions the development of scientific research methodologies and denies the very criteria that distinguish science from non-science is, in fact, very dangerous, as it could cause significant social chaos.
According to British science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke, sufficiently advanced science is indistinguishable from magic. In fact, as science becomes increasingly sophisticated, the scope of knowledge within the broader field of science that individual scientists can grasp is shrinking. Inevitably, the boundary between pre-science and normal science will gradually become blurred. Theories that transcend existing methodologies, such as quantum mechanics and string theory, are gaining attention. Therefore, the philosophy of science in the future must adopt the diversity of Fayerabend’s anarchistic epistemology and establish a more multifaceted system for the formulation of knowledge.
