In this blog post, we examine the extent to which South Korea’s birth rate statistics reflect reality, as well as their limitations and potential for distortion.
Why is South Korea’s low birth rate so serious?
The serious problem of low birth rates facing South Korean society is not a recent development. Every month, when Statistics Korea releases the monthly number of newborns, the media floods the airwaves with alarming reports claiming the number has hit an all-time low. Since April 2016, the monthly number of newborns has set a record low for 32 consecutive months when compared to the same month in previous years (as of November 2018). This means that the number of newborns born in November 2018 was the lowest ever recorded for the month of November since statistical surveys began. The situation is the same for other months as well. In 2018, South Korea’s total fertility rate was 0.98, the lowest among OECD member countries. This clearly demonstrates that South Korea’s low birthrate problem is so severe that it is difficult to compare with other nations.
As the situation grows increasingly dire, the government is spending a significant budget every year in an effort to boost the birthrate by any means necessary. It is reported that from 2006, when the First Basic Plan for a Low-Birthrate and Aging Society was launched, through 2018—a span of 13 years—the government spent a total of 143 trillion won on measures to address the low birthrate alone. Experts estimate that the actual amount spent is likely even higher when including budgets for other related projects that were not explicitly labeled as “low-birthrate countermeasures.”
The increasingly serious problem of low birth rates
The results are meager compared to the massive budget invested. The total fertility rate, which stood at 1.07 in 2005 when low birth rate measures began in earnest, actually fell further to 0.98 in 2018.
Experts point out that the reason the low birthrate phenomenon is worsening despite the government’s massive spending is that the target was misidentified from the start. They argue that the focus of existing policies—which have centered on increasing the birthrate among married couples—must shift to those who are postponing marriage due to unfavorable circumstances. This means addressing issues such as housing to make it easier for people to get married. The basis for this argument is that married couples are already having a sufficient number of children, and the low birth rate is a phenomenon caused by low marriage rates.
Above all, since the birth rate is calculated by including all women of childbearing age (15–49) regardless of marital status, the resulting statistics are inevitably disconnected from reality. Some have pointed out that this error in defining the population hinders efforts to find the right solution to the low birth rate problem. In this chapter, we will examine the problems with the total fertility rate statistics used to calculate the birth rate in Korea and discuss the root cause of the low birth rate problem facing Korean society.
First, let’s take a closer look at the severity of the low birth rate problem facing Korean society. In 2017, the total number of births was 357,771, a decrease of 48,472 from 2016. As the number of births declined, the fertility rate also fell; the total fertility rate in 2017 was 1.05, a decrease of 0.12 from the 1.17 recorded a year earlier.
Demographers say that to maintain the current population level in the future, the fertility rate must reach 2.1 children per woman. This is known as the replacement fertility rate, and when we consider that today’s fertility rate is less than half of that, we can truly grasp how serious South Korea’s low birthrate problem is. The National Statistical Office predicts that if the fertility rate remains at the 2017 level of 1.05, South Korea’s population will begin to decline starting in 2027; however, the fertility rate for 2018 has already fallen below 1.0. Considering that the population decline was previously projected for 2031 in 2015, the onset of population decline is being pushed forward.
Once a population begins to decline, it is extremely difficult to reverse the trend. This is because, when the population of the parent generation capable of having children has already shrunk, it is difficult to increase the number of newborns even if the fertility rate rises. Even if the government and society implement various measures and work hard to raise the birth rate, it is a problem that cannot be solved in the short term because it takes roughly 30 years for the children born as a result of those efforts to grow up and become parents themselves.
For example, a total fertility rate of 1 means that the number of newborns is halved with each passing generation. After just two generations, the number of newborns will have fallen to one-quarter of that of their grandparents’ generation. Let’s simplify this a bit to make it easier to understand. Imagine there are 1,000 couples in their 30s who are capable of having children. Since there are 1,000 couples, there are 1,000 men and 1,000 women. The total fertility rate for this group is 1, so a total of 1,000 babies will be born. Assuming there are 500 boys and 500 girls, let’s imagine that 30 years later, these children marry each other to form 500 couples. The total fertility rate remains at 1. In this case, a total of 500 children will be born. The population of a generation that originally numbered 2,000 has shrunk to 500—or one-quarter—in just two generations.
In a situation where the population of the generation capable of becoming parents has shrunk, it will take a very long time to resolve the issue, even if we desperately try to raise the fertility rate. So, let me ask a question here. We’ve been using the term “total fertility rate” all along, but what exactly does this term mean? Does it refer to the number of children born to married couples during their marriage? We often assume that the fertility rate refers to the number of children born to married couples. However, the meaning of the total fertility rate is far removed from this common perception. Furthermore, the fact that the statistical definition of the total fertility rate differs from what people generally think is an obstacle to our society effectively addressing the low birthrate problem.
First, let’s look at the precise definition of the total fertility rate. The total fertility rate refers to the average number of children that a woman in the childbearing age group (15 to 49 years old) is expected to have over her lifetime. It is a statistical measure that includes all women in that age group, regardless of whether they are married or unmarried. Since this is a direct quote from a dictionary definition, it may be difficult to understand. To explain how the total fertility rate is calculated in simpler terms: it is the number of newborns born to women in a specific age group (15–49 years old) in a given year, divided by the total number of women in that age group. Adding up the fertility rates calculated for each age group yields the total fertility rate. For example, to calculate the “fertility rate for 30-year-old women,” we first divide the number of children born to 30-year-old women in a given year by the total number of women in that age group. After calculating the age-specific fertility rates for women in each age group from 15 to 49, adding them all together yields the total fertility rate. The total fertility rate for 2018, calculated in this manner, was 0.98.
The Flaws in the Total Fertility Rate
However, this total fertility rate has several shortcomings that make it disconnected from reality. The first issue is that it includes unmarried women. Ninety-eight percent of births in Korea occur to married couples. It is still rare for unmarried women to give birth in Korea. While it is generally the norm to have children after marriage, the total fertility rate assumes that even unmarried women can have children when compiling statistics. Additionally, the inclusion of females aged 15 to 18—who are still considered adolescents—in the total fertility rate is also cited as a problem. Assuming that women in this age group, who are not yet adults, can have children and including them in the statistics creates a disconnect from reality.
Of course, there are reasons why we have no choice but to use the total fertility rate. Korea is not the only country that uses it. Since it is an international statistic used by almost all countries worldwide, we have no choice but to use it to compare Korea’s fertility rate with the rest of the world, even if there are aspects that are out of touch with reality. However, this does not mean we should completely ignore the flaws inherent in the total fertility rate.
On average, how many children do Korean couples have during their married life? Is it similar to the total fertility rate, with most couples having only about one child? When asked about the causes of the low birth rate, many people respond, “Isn’t it because couples these days don’t have children even after getting married?” In fact, many of the measures against the low birth rate introduced by the government and local authorities are policies designed to encourage married couples to have children. However, a closer look at birth-related statistics reveals that both the diagnosis of the cause and the proposed solutions are flawed.
The total fertility rate announced by Statistics Korea in 2016 was 1.17. However, when Professor Lee Cheol-hee of the Department of Economics at Seoul National University calculated the total fertility rate for that same year by singling out only married women among those aged 15–49, the figure came out to 2.23. This means that, when looking solely at married couples, they are having an average of two children each. Married couples were already having more children than the replacement fertility rate needed to maintain the population. The total fertility rate calculated using only married women aged 15 to 49 is called the “total fertility rate among married women.” It refers to the total fertility rate of women who have a spouse.
Let’s take a closer look at Professor Lee Cheol-hee’s research findings. The total fertility rate among married women, which stood at 1.7 in 2000, fluctuated over the following 16 years but generally trended upward. This trend stands in stark contrast to the common perception that the low birthrate problem has become severe because married couples are not having children. In fact, couples today are having more children than those in the early 2000s, and it is projected that each couple will have at least two children.
So why has the overall total fertility rate fallen significantly, even though married couples are having more children than they did in the early 2000s? It is precisely because fewer people are getting married. As the number of unmarried adults living alone increases, the number of newborns is steadily declining. As of 2016, unmarried women accounted for 49% of women aged 20–49—nearly half the population. In 2000, that figure was just 29.6%. Looking at the number of marriages, a total of 281,600 couples got married in 2016, the lowest figure in 42 years since 1974. This clearly indicates that people are not getting married.
These findings clearly demonstrate that the focus of low-birthrate countermeasures must shift. The emphasis of these policies must be shifted to some extent from “creating an environment conducive to married couples having children” to “creating a society conducive to young people getting married.” Of course, this does not mean that policies for married couples should be discontinued. Rather, it means we must not overlook the primary cause of the declining birthrate.
To solve the low birthrate problem, we must first create an environment where young people can more easily get married and start families. Only by prioritizing the budget and resources allocated to low birthrate countermeasures toward building a “society conducive to marriage” can we resolve this issue. Professor Lee Cheol-hee’s research findings also support this argument. In 2000, 70.4% of women aged 15–49 were married. By 2016, this rate had dropped to 51%. The research team concluded that if the marriage rate among women aged 15–49 in 2016 had remained the same as in 2000, the total fertility rate would have been 2.01. This implies that if the marriage rate of 70.4% had been maintained in 2016, there would have been no need to worry about the number of newborns. A rate of 2.01 is similar to the total fertility rate of 2.06 recorded in 1983, before the low birthrate problem became a major issue.
Ultimately, no matter how much budget is poured into the issue, any measures that fail to properly identify the root causes are merely half-baked solutions. Furthermore, Korean society must now recognize the legal status of children born to cohabiting couples as equal to that of children born to married couples, and create an environment where children of unmarried mothers can grow up without discrimination. Efforts are needed to improve laws and systems so that children born to single mothers do not face any discrimination as they grow up. While it is impossible to change societal prejudices overnight, laws and systems can certainly be reformed.
Experts sometimes refer to the demographic changes caused by low birth rates and an aging population as a “future that was already foretold.” This is because simply analyzing demographic tables allows us to anticipate how Korean society will change in the coming years and decades. We will discuss the changes that population decline will bring to Korean society in greater detail later.
