In this blog post, we take an in-depth look at whether religion is a product of adaptation that emerged during human evolution or a cultural deception designed to overcome existential limitations.
There are various religions in the world, such as Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam, and the number of believers in these three religions alone reaches approximately 4.3 billion, accounting for 62% of the global population. Thus, religion has indeed spread extensively. So, what characteristics of religion have made such widespread dissemination possible?
Before proceeding with the discussion, I will clearly define the concept of “adaptation.” There are two main types of adaptation: evolutionary adaptation and social adaptation. Evolutionary adaptation refers to the concept of genes changing to suit the environment through a process called “natural selection,” and it carries a more fundamental meaning. In contrast, social adaptation is an abstract concept involving changes in the lifestyles of individuals or groups to suit the social environment. In this paper, I will limit the discussion of the concept of “adaptation” to evolutionary adaptation.
The proposition that “religion is an adaptation” is linked to the claim that “there are genes that lead to the choice of religion, and those genes have been passed down through natural selection.” In fact, recent cognitive science research views religion and belief in supernatural beings as byproducts of the combination of various cognitive and emotional mechanisms that evolved through natural selection to perform everyday tasks. Conversely, there is also the argument that religion is merely a kind of “trick” designed to compensate for deficiencies that arose during human evolution.
Brockman, author of *Intelligent Thought*, belongs to the latter camp. He argues that religion is not an adaptation and that no genes exist to explain it. In other words, the explanation that religion is an adaptation “designed” to help our ancestors perform specific tasks is not valid. He states that when people face existential problems they cannot solve—such as death or morality—they turn to a transcendent being. In the case of moral judgment, while what is right cannot be defined by scientific standards, humans instinctively judge it to be right. To explain this, the introduction of a transcendent being is inevitable, and the flourishing of religion stems from its ability to satisfy our inner emotional thirst and society’s moral needs. Brockman’s position is that religion is not an adaptive outcome passed down through generations, but rather a stratagem to overcome existential limitations.
The author also agrees with Brockman’s view and maintains that religion is not an adaptation. Religion is a social phenomenon and cannot be explained by adaptation, a scientific concept. Scientifically, adaptation is deeply linked to reproduction. Organisms adapt to their environment to preserve and spread their genes. Therefore, the claim that religion is an adaptation must be supported by evidence that humans’ choice of religion is advantageous for reproduction. In other words, just as in the animal kingdom, where a mother protects her offspring or avoids the danger of predators out of instinct, religion must also be advantageous for gene preservation. Although religion and genes may appear unrelated at first glance, since human survival is deeply connected to mental states, if religion has a positive influence on mental states, it can be argued that religion and genes are to some extent related. The following are the positive functions that religion provides for the human mental state.
First, religion serves as an outlet that allows humans to escape their existential limitations. This logic remains valid even from the perspective that religion is not an adaptation. Almost all religions deal with existential issues, and as mentioned earlier, the introduction of a transcendent being makes these issues solvable. For example, the Christian concept of heaven and the Buddhist concept of Nirvana transform believers’ fear of death into a positive state of mind. Compared to non-religious people who have a great fear of death, believers can be said to enjoy a certain benefit.
Second, religion provides a closely knit community. In societies that have rapidly modernized since the Industrial Revolution, feelings of isolation have deepened, causing many people to suffer from mental anguish such as depression. Religion serves as a refuge for these individuals; under the guidance of a transcendent being, believers share a common consciousness and form close bonds. In Christianity, the culture of calling one another “brothers” and “sisters” is a prime example of the religious community’s function. Going back to primitive societies, primitive beliefs such as totemism were also the sole means of binding people together into tribes.
Based on these functions of religion, it can be said that there is a certain degree of correlation between religion and gene preservation. However, it is difficult to explain the essence of religion based on these functions alone. This is because it fails to explain the origins of religion or the meaning of religious rituals. Some might argue that religion originated from a genetic mutation. In other words, a religious gene arose by chance, and its associated functions aided survival, leading to its spread to the present day. However, when attempting to explain religion through a mutated gene, one cannot overlook the fact that religion emerged and spread universally across the globe. Since the frequency of such gene mutations cannot be that high, explaining religion through mutated genes is illogical. If a “religious gene” existed, it would likely have been expressed inevitably due to environmental factors. Thus, attempts to link the functions of religion to its origins by framing it as a gene ultimately lead to a logical contradiction.
Even in light of the statement by George Williams, a leading figure in evolutionary biology—that “we can only judge a trait to be an adaptation if we can demonstrate that the effect it produces is precisely the function of that trait, that is, that the trait was designed by natural selection to increase the fitness of our ancestors”—it is difficult to conclude that the functions provided by religion are benefits unique to religion. Therefore, viewing religion as an adaptation is even more illogical.
Furthermore, assuming the existence of a “religious gene,” this could to some extent explain why approximately 80% of modern people choose to be religious. The strong cohesion within religious groups can also be interpreted as evidence that religion is an adapted trait. In other words, the argument is that since those who do not choose religion are at a disadvantage in natural selection, the number of people who do choose religion is steadily increasing. However, in modern society, the number of second-generation non-believers is increasing, which is a major weakness in the logic that attempts to explain religion through genes. This suggests that religion is simply a social phenomenon.
If religion is a social phenomenon, its modes of transmission can be divided into voluntary and involuntary methods. Voluntary methods refer to cases where individuals choose religion because they feel a need for it, while involuntary methods refer to cases where religion is chosen due to external pressure. Furthermore, the fact that young children inherit the religion of their parents’ generation can also be viewed as a heteronomous method. If we consider that religion began based on a kind of deception, these transmission processes can all be regarded as part of that “deception.” Because these transmission methods appear powerful and share similarities with adaptation, the rapid spread of religion may seem akin to adaptation.
For this explanation to hold validity, it must be premised on the assumption that “religion is based on deception.” Since prehistoric times, human society has suffered from existential problems. People in prehistoric times felt fear toward unknown entities such as lightning and fire, while in modern society, they feel fear toward problems such as death. Religion serves as an escape from these problems, but it is not a practical solution. Nevertheless, believers trust that religion solves their problems. This is a form of “deception” in which humans regard objects they cannot understand as transcendent beings and derive comfort from them.
Furthermore, Atran cites examples such as cosmetics and perfume—which become more diverse and gain a larger user base with each generation—to argue that deception serves a cultural purpose. He suggests that religious rituals also reinforce group cohesion by treating deception as something sacred. In reality, believers accept the stories in sacred texts as fact, yet there is no way to prove them. In other words, religion is a concept without substance, and the benefits it provides can be said to be nothing more than something equally insubstantial. Philosopher Phil Zuckerman conducted in-depth interviews with citizens of Scandinavian countries and concluded that “the claim that society becomes more dangerous as religiosity weakens is false; rather, a more moral and prosperous society can be created.” This suggests that it is difficult to view religion as serving the function of group cohesion. From this perspective, borrowing George Williams’ words, we can conclude that “religion is not an adaptation.”
Many philosophers have long studied whether religion is an adaptation, but the answer remains unclear. Neither side has a claim that has been scientifically proven beyond a doubt, and I believe this question is linked to the fundamental issue of religion: “Does God exist?” The reason we cannot give a definitive answer to this is likely because the origin of religion remains ambiguous. Nevertheless, based on this discussion, I argue that the claim “Religion is not an adaptation” is more persuasive than “Religion is an adaptation.”
